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On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was executed 
by lethal injection in Oklahoma.1 Lockett was convicted 
of murdering nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman, 
whom he shot twice with a shotgun and then buried while 
still alive, with the help of his accomplices.2 Of his own 
volition,3 Lockett confessed three days later and was 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Lockett’s 
death resulted from a botched lethal injection.4 The drugs 
                                               
1 Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton 
Lockett, THE ATLANTIC (June 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. (“Governor Fallin gave a press conference to remind 
everyone about Lockett’s crimes, voice her support for the 
2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/3
JUDICIAL HOT POTATO 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2018) 
 
 
[163] 
used to execute Lockett were both confidential and 
experimental.5 The intravenous line (“IV”) used to render 
Lockett unconscious was pulled from his vein and became 
infiltrated, and much of the lethal drugs did not make it 
into Lockett’s bloodstream.6 As a result, Lockett awoke 
and sat up on the gurney in the middle of his execution, 
unable to speak, with blood pooling beneath him caused 
by the infiltrated IV.7 The execution was botched to such 
a level that the warden actually tried to stop it, 
eventually calling and briefing the governor on the 
situation.8 However, there were already enough drugs in 
Lockett’s system; he died ten minutes later, apparently 
in agony the entire time.9 
 Prior to this incident, on April 23, 2014, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court dissolved a stay of execution 
and rendered a per curiam opinion that resulted in 
Lockett’s execution.10 Lockett v. Evans is the result of 
more than ten years of interrelated appeals and 
constitutional challenges, spanning federal courts of 
appeals and state courts of last resort.11 Lockett’s later 
appeals, challenging a lethal injection disclosure 
prohibition statute, also included Charles Warner, a man 
                                               
death penalty, and announce an investigation into what had 
gone wrong.”). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (“Ten minutes later, at 7:06 p.m., Clayton Lockett was 
declared dead. He had been dying amidst all the chaos, just 
very slowly and in apparent agony.”). 
10 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (Okla., 2014) (“The stay 
of execution entered by this Court on April 21, 2014, is hereby 
dissolved.”). 
11 See, e.g., Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
157157 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011); Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 
58 (Okla. 2014); Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). 
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facing execution for raping and murdering an eleven-
month-old baby.12 The state of Oklahoma executed 
Warner on January 15, 2015,13 after a 180-day stay of 
execution during which authorities investigated the 
botched execution of Lockett.14 Warner’s last words were, 
“My body is on fire.”15 
Warner’s and Lockett’s appeal process was unique 
because they challenged the constitutionality of a law 
that classified the lethal injection drugs used to execute 
them.16  If Warner and Lockett succeeded in their 
constitutional challenge, their executions would be 
stayed. In forty-eight states, there would be no question 
that a court of last resort could render a decision on the 
constitutionality of a lethal injection classification law. 
Oklahoma, however, is not one of them, due to its 
bifurcated court of last resort structure. The only other 
state that maintains a bifurcated structure of civil and 
                                               
12 Diana Baldwin, Man Found Guilty of Baby Rape, Murder, 
NEWSOK (June 24, 2003), http://newsok.com/man-found-
guilty-of-baby-rape-murder/article/1934580. 
13 Cary Aspinwall, Charles Warner is Executed, TULSA WORLD 
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/charles-
warner-is-executed-here-s-the-story-of-his/article_af39c542-
08d0-5bd6-80ac-01a6f1c668ee.html. 
14 Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Agrees to 180 Day Stay of 
Execution for Death-row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/oklahoma-
180-day-stay-execution-charles-warner. The Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals issued the stay of execution for Mr. 
Warner, rather than the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.  
15 Sean Murphy, Charles Warner Executed: Baby Killer Says 
‘My Body Is On Fire’ During Lethal Injection In Oklahoma, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/01/15/charles-frederick-warner-executed_n_6483040.html. 
16 Lockett, 356 P.3d at 61 (“The appeal by the DOC and its 
interim Director has placed the issue of the secrecy provision 
of section 1015(B) undisputedly within this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction.”). 
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criminal courts of last resort is Texas.17 This Article 
explores the history of Texas’s and Oklahoma’s 
bifurcated courts of last resort, the similarities and 
differences between the two systems, as well as some of 
the controversies that have arisen due to jurisdictional 
questions. The Article concludes with a recommendation 
that Oklahoma and Texas each adopt a unified court of 
last resort.  
When cases arise that implicate both civil and 
criminal issues, the Oklahoma and Texas judiciaries are 
likely to suffer from “judicial hot potato,” by sending the 
cases back and forth between the criminal and civil 
divisions of the respective court.18 That is not to say, 
however, that questions of jurisdiction do not arise in 
unified systems, such as the United States federal courts. 
The key difference there lies in the vesting of a single 
court, rather than dual courts, with the final decision on 
whether a case is civil or criminal in nature. Although no 
system is perfect, by adopting a unified court of last 
resort, Texas and Oklahoma will have a single decision-
maker with a clear grant of jurisdiction to determine the 
classification of cases. 
 
                                               
17 LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 
220 (1939) (“[N]o state in the Union except Texas and 
Oklahoma has a separate court of criminal appeals.”); see also 
Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story 
of Two High Courts, 53 JUDGES’ J. 4 (2014). 
18 The colloquial phrase “hot potato” is defined as “a 
controversial question or issue that involves unpleasant or 
dangerous consequences for anyone dealing with it.” Hot 
Potato, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hot%20potato. The phrase derives from the popular 
children’s party game in which participants toss to each other 
a small object resembling a potato while music is playing. See 
generally JACK MAGUIRE, HOPSCOTCH, HANGMAN, HOT POTATO 
& HA HA HA: A RULEBOOK OF CHILDREN’S GAMES (1990). When 
the music stops playing, the player holding the object is 
eliminated and cannot proceed to the next round. Id. 
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I. History 
 
 Both Texas’s and Oklahoma’s court structures 
have evolved over time, becoming the labyrinths they 
remain today. Political motivations and increased case 
volume have contributed to the byzantine network of trial 
and appellate courts that Texas maintains. In Oklahoma, 
large-scale reforms were achieved in the wake of scandal, 
but those reforms failed to address the problems inherent 
in bifurcated courts of last resort. Both states have failed 
to eliminate their bifurcated structures throughout their 
history, despite attempts to do so. 
 
A. Texas 
1. Pre-Civil War 
 
Texas became a republic in 1836,19 after declaring 
independence from Mexico.20 Texas’s first judiciary as an 
independent nation had a single supreme court composed 
of a chief justice and associate justices.21 The associate 
justices were judges of the district courts and functioned 
as the supreme court when a majority was present, which 
constituted a quorum.22 These provisions were in the 
original draft of the constitutional convention of 1836 as 
well,23 likely indicating that the judiciary was not a 
contested issue throughout the convention. 
                                               
19 REP. OF TEX. CONST. pmbl. (1836). 
20 TEX. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1836). 
21 REP. OF TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–9 (1836). 
22 Id. § 7. 
23 JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE FREE, SOVEREIGN, AND 
INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF TEXAS, IN GENERAL CONVENTION, 
ASSEMBLED 821–904 (H.P.N. Gammel, ed., Gammel Book Co. 
1898) (1836). 
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In 1845, the United States annexed Texas.24 With its 
annexation, Texas adopted a state constitution.25 The 
new constitution changed the structure of the judiciary, 
with three justices (one chief justice and two associate 
justices) sitting on the supreme court, any two of whom 
would constitute a quorum.26 The 1845 Constitution 
specifically granted habeas corpus jurisdiction to the 
Texas Supreme Court, a power it did not retain in the 
1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas.27 In addition, 
the 1845 Constitution gave district courts original 
jurisdiction in all criminal cases, which those courts did 
not retain under the 1836 Constitution.28 
In 1861, Texas seceded from the United States and 
ratified a new constitution upon joining the Confederate 
States of America.29 Notably, the 1861 Secession 
Constitution did not come with changes to the judicial 
department, however. The Constitution of 1861 kept the 
judiciary provisions in Article IV, and even maintained 
the same sections.30 Texas became a member of the 
Confederate States of America on March 23, 1861, when 
the Secession Convention adjourned for the last time.31 
 
2. Reconstruction 
 
After the Civil War, Texas began a tumultuous 
period of constitutional change in its judiciary. During 
Reconstruction, Texas was subject to federal military 
                                               
24 C.T. Neu, Annexation, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (Sept. 23, 
2015), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mga02. 
25 Id. 
26 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1845). 
27 Id. § 3. 
28 Id. § 10. 
29 JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 8 
(William Winkler, ed., 1912) (1861). 
30 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1–5, 10 (1861). 
31 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, HANDBOOK OF 
TEXAS ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.tshaonline.org/ 
handbook/online/articles/mjs01. 
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occupation and ousted all five supreme court justices on 
September 10, 1867.32 Between 1866 and 1876 Texas had 
three different constitutions.33 
 
a. Constitution of Texas (1866) 
 
 The Constitution of 1866 was written in order to 
regain admittance to the Union. Among other changes, 
the Constitution of 1866 significantly changed the 
structure of the Texas judiciary. Section 1 of Article IV 
added new constitutional courts (courts created by the 
constitution) including criminal courts, county courts, 
and corporation courts.34 The county courts had original 
jurisdiction in “all misdemeanors and petty offences, as 
the same are now, or may hereafter be defined by law; of 
such civil cases, where the matter in controversy shall 
not exceed five hundred dollars.”35 The Constitution of 
1866 also added justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction 
is further defined by law, and who had jurisdiction in civil 
matters totaling less than $100.36 
The Constitution of 1866 also added two more 
justices to the Texas Supreme Court, for a total of four 
associate justices and one chief justice.37 The appellate 
jurisdiction of the supreme court changed slightly in 
1866. Formerly, the supreme court had appellate 
jurisdiction that extended to all matters, but the 
legislature could limit appellate jurisdiction in criminal 
cases and interlocutory judgments.38 In the 1866 
                                               
32 Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court 
of Texas: Reconstruction and “Redemption” (1866-1882), 40 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 17, 25 (2008). 
33 TEX. CONST. art. V (1876); TEX. CONST. art. V (1869); TEX. 
CONST. art. IV (1868); TEX. CONST. art. IV (1866). 
34 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866). 
35 Id. § 16. 
36 Id. § 19. 
37 Id. § 2. 
38 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1861). 
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Constitution, the legislature could no longer limit felony 
criminal jurisdiction from the supreme court through 
law.39 The Constitution of 1866 also provided for the 
election of district judges and expanded their jurisdiction 
beyond that of the Constitution of 1861 to include 
appellate jurisdiction from the inferior courts, original 
jurisdiction in cases dealing with slander or libel, and 
suits for the trial or title to land.40 
 
b. Constitution of 1869 
 
 Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution of 
1866, Winfield Scott Hancock, the military commander 
over Texas during Reconstruction, called for an election 
in Texas to determine whether a new constitution should 
be created.41 Texans overwhelmingly voted for a new 
constitutional convention, and the convention assembled 
on June 1, 1868.42 The convention lasted 150 days but the 
delegates did not complete a constitution.43 Nonetheless, 
what was written was submitted to the voters of the state 
and became the Constitution of 1869.44 
 The judicial department, particularly the Texas 
Supreme Court, was significantly changed in the 
Constitution of 1869. The supreme court was reduced to 
three justices45 who were subjected to nine-year term 
limits, rather than the ten-year terms under the 
Constitution of 1866.46 The district court judges retained 
appellate jurisdiction of inferior courts.47 The county 
                                               
39 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1866). 
40 Id. § 6. 
41 Claude Elliot, Constitutional Convention of 1868-69, 
HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (June 12, 2010), 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjc04. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 TEX. CONST. art. V, § II (1869). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. § VII. 
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courts were merged with the justice of the peace courts, 
the extent of their jurisdiction to be delineated by the 
legislature.48 
 
c. Constitution of 1876 
 
 The Constitution of 1876 is the current 
constitution of Texas, but it has been amended numerous 
times since its ratification in 1876.49 The Constitution of 
1876 differed greatly from the Constitution of 1869. It 
included, as constitutional requirements, a supreme 
court, a court of appeals, district courts, county courts, 
commissioners’ courts, courts of justices of the peace, and 
other courts that may be established by law.50 The 
Constitution of 1876 also gave the legislature the ability 
to establish specifically criminal district courts as long as 
the city had over 30,000 residents.51 The Texas Supreme 
Court remained a three-justice court,52 but, critically, its 
jurisdiction over criminal matters was eliminated. The 
supreme court had civil appellate jurisdiction only, 
reaching only the cases in which the district courts had 
original or appellate jurisdiction.53 With the absence of 
criminal jurisdiction, the supreme court also lost the 
ability to issue writs of habeas corpus. 
 The Constitution of 1876 created the Texas Court 
of Appeals, possibly in response to a congested docket.54 
Contrary to its usual nomenclature, the court of appeals 
was not an intermediate appeals court. Rather, it had 
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal matters, as well as 
                                               
48 Id. § XX. 
49 See, e.g., TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT 
ONE, THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL 
OVERVIEW 3–5 (1990). 
50 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. § 2. 
53 Id. § 3. 
54In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 379 (Tex. 2011). 
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some civil cases arising from the county courts.55 The 
court of appeals was also elected every six years and 
consisted of three sitting judges.56 
 There are multiple theories for the bifurcation of 
civil and criminal jurisdiction between the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Appeals.57 Most 
hold the view that the courts’ jurisdiction was bifurcated 
due to a backlog of cases.  
Others hold the view that the Constitution of 1876 
was a “revanchist document: The fruition of a resurgence 
of state power by segregationist, mostly ex-Confederate 
Democrats after a decade under Union-run 
Reconstruction.”58 The resurgence of state power by 
segregationists allowed the Texas Democrats to change 
the constitution in order to bypass a “radical Republican” 
reconstruction court.59 This new court would allow the 
Democrats to ignore odious precedent laid down by the 
Texas Supreme Court, further reinforced by the fact that 
in the new constitution only the Texas Court of Appeals 
could hear habeas petitions during a time of martial 
law.60 The state could now avoid a reconstruction court 
when trying to enforce Jim Crow laws.61 
Either way, the bifurcated system failed to 
achieve what the drafters wanted. By 1879, the courts 
continued to fall behind in their caseloads, and the 
                                               
55 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1876). 
56 Id. § 5. 
57 See Maurice Chammah, Bill Renews Debate on Merging Top 
Two Courts, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/13/bill-merge-highest-
courts-brings-back-old-debate/; Scott Henson, Caveats to 
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal 
Appeals, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2012/12/caveats-to-
debate-on-merging-texas.html. 
58 Henson, supra note 57. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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legislature created a commission of appeals.62 This too 
failed, and by 1891, the citizenry of Texas voted to 
entirely supplant the judicial article of the Constitution 
of 1876.63 
 
3. Amendments to 1876 Constitution 
a. 1891 Amendment 
 
 In 1891, the state of Texas adopted a wholesale 
replacement of its judiciary through an amendment.64 
The 1891 amendment removed the Texas Court of 
Appeals and replaced it with the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.65 Thus, the 
new system added a mid-level appeals court and gave the 
Texas Supreme Court the responsibility of resolving 
conflicts between the courts of civil appeals.66 
 The Texas Supreme Court maintained its limit of 
three sitting justices, as did the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals.67 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was also 
composed of three judges per court.68 After adopting the 
1891 amendment, the Texas legislature added two more 
                                               
62 James T. Worthen, The Organizational & Structural 
Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts in Texas, 1892–
2003, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004). 
63 Id. at 35. 
64 See generally S.J. Res. 16, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1891). 
65 Id. § 1. 
66 Id. Additionally, it is important to note that the 1891 
amendment gave the Texas Supreme Court the ability to issue 
writs of habeas corpus, which had not been present in the 
Constitution of 1876. S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 
1891); see also Tex. Const. art. V § 3 (1876). The 1891 
amendment also explicitly eliminated the use of the writ of 
mandamus by the Texas Supreme Court against the Governor. 
S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 1891). 
67 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4 (Tex. 1891). 
68 Id. § 6. 
12
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/3
JUDICIAL HOT POTATO 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2018) 
 
 
[173] 
courts of appeal.69 The term limits remained six years for 
each justice and judge, with each elected by popular 
vote.70 No additional courts were changed by the 1891 
amendment.71 
 The next set of constitutional amendments 
affecting the judiciary did not occur until 1954.72 That 
does not mean, however, that there were no legislative 
changes to the judiciary. Between 1893 and 1967, Texas 
added eleven new appellate districts.73 The further 
constitutional changes were concerned, primarily, with 
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals. 
Before addressing these changes, I will briefly describe 
what has occurred at the trial court level since 1876. 
 
b. Trial Courts in Texas 
 
 Texas has a dizzying array of trial courts. 
Constitutional trial courts include district, county, and 
justice of the peace courts. There are currently 507 
district courts across the state.74 Unfortunately, the 
legislature, in an effort to deal with changing caseloads, 
has created statutory district courts that have specific 
jurisdictional preferences.75 Thus, a litigant will have to 
determine the correct district court in which to bring her 
                                               
69 W.O. Murray, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 25 TEX. B.J. 269, 
270 (1962). 
70 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4, 6 (Tex. 1891). 
71 There still remained district courts, county courts, 
commissioner’s courts, and courts of justices of the peace. S.J. 
Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1891). 
72 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS 
CONSTITUTION SINCE 1876 65–70 (Feb. 2016). 
73 See Worthen, supra note 62 at 36. 
74 State District Courts, TEXAS STATE DIRECTORY, 
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/dist/ (last visited on Dec. 2, 
2016). 
75 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE 
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 30 
(1990). 
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claim, even though she may live within the geographical 
confines of multiple district courts. Litigation in Texas is 
further confused by the existence of the county courts, 
which consist of statutory county courts and 
constitutional county courts.76 Statutory county courts 
actually have no common thread: They are simply a 
patchwork creation of local judicial needs.77 There is no 
commonality among them. Constitutional county courts 
are required in each county, where the judge is the chief 
executive officer of the county. A county court judge is not 
constitutionally required to be an attorney, and she has 
limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.78 
 Finally, there are the justice of the peace courts. 
These courts have varying jurisdiction by statute and 
primarily operate as small claims courts and cases 
involving traffic fines.79 Only about eight percent of the 
justices of the peace are lawyers,80 yet justice of the peace 
courts are responsible for a significant portion of state 
revenue.81 
 There are many other forms of trial courts in 
Texas, but the subject is beyond the scope of this Article.82 
It is enough to know that the Texas judicial system 
includes a confusing mass of overlapping jurisdictions 
and courts, oftentimes run by non-lawyers. The existence 
of this patchwork only adds to the confusion of litigants. 
As will be discussed later, litigants struggle already in 
                                               
76 Id. at 41, 45. 
77 Id. at 41–43. 
78 Id. at 48. 
79 Id. at 49. 
80 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 383 (Tex. 2011). 
81 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE 
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 49 
(1990). 
82 For more information on Texas’s judicial system, see 
Guittard, infra, note 84; 2010 Annual Report for the Texas 
Judiciary, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454879/2010-Annual-
Report2_25_11.pdf. 
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the quest for the proper trial court. Bifurcated courts of 
last resort only add to the confusion and headache faced 
by litigants, especially when they do not know which 
appeals court has jurisdiction in their case. 
 
c. Amendments Since 1891 Regarding the 
Structure and Function of the Appellate 
Courts in Texas. 
 
 In 1945 Texas increased the size of its supreme 
court from three to nine justices.83 In 1966, Texas 
increased the criminal court of appeals from three to five 
members.84 Then, in 1977 the criminal court of appeals 
increased to nine sitting judges.85 The court of appeals 
has also changed significantly since 1891, including the 
addition of criminal jurisdiction. 
In 1978, Texas adopted a constitutional 
amendment allowing for more than three members on 
the court of civil appeals.86 In 1980, the criminal backlog 
was so great that the average disposition of a criminal 
appeal was three years.87 The resulting constitutional 
amendment gave the court of appeals appellate 
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal appeals, except 
death penalty cases.88 This system is how the Texas 
appellate courts operate today. There are fourteen 
appellate districts, with varying numbers of judges on 
each court. This appellate court has both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, with the sole exception of death 
penalty cases. The Texas Supreme Court and Texas 
                                               
83 S.J. Res. 8, 49th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, § 2 
(Tex. 1945). 
84 Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 
14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 (1983). 
85 Id. at 552. 
86 Worthen, supra note 62 at 38. 
87 Guittard, supra note 84, at 552. 
88 S.J. Res. 36, 66th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, §§ 5, 
6 (Tex. 1979).  
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Court of Criminal Appeals each have nine justices and 
exercise only civil or only criminal jurisdiction, 
respectively. The stopgap legislation and patchwork 
courts in Texas used to alleviate backlogs of cases has led 
to the jurisdictional issues which will be taken up in Part 
II, infra. 
 
B. Oklahoma 
1. 1907 Constitution 
 
The original judiciary article of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, ratified in 1907, provided specifically for a 
supreme court, district courts, county courts, courts of 
justices of the peace, municipal courts, and allowed for 
the creation of a criminal court of appeals.89 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court maintained criminal 
jurisdiction as long as there was not a statutorily created 
criminal court of appeals.90 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court was composed of five justices, divided into five 
judicial districts, nominated by political parties, and 
voted for by the state in an at-large election.91 The term 
of office was six years.92 
District courts were courts of general jurisdiction, 
and divided into twenty-one districts.93 County courts 
were specifically for probate, matters in controversy less 
than $1,000, and misdemeanors.94 County courts were 
also courts of appeals for justice of the peace courts.95 
Justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction 
with county courts, but for less money, and lesser 
offenses.96 
                                               
89 OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (1907). 
90 Id. § 2. 
91 Id. § 3. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. §§ 9, 10. 
94 Id. §§ 12, 13. 
95 Id. § 14. 
96 Id. § 18. 
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The first criminal court of appeals was created in 
the 1907–1908 session of the Oklahoma legislature, 
which was the first legislative session of Oklahoma.97 
This act gave the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals 
exclusive criminal appellate jurisdiction, with the 
exception that the Oklahoma Supreme Court was to 
make determinations of constitutionality, should they 
arise.98 The 1909 legislature perpetuated the criminal 
court of appeals, repealed all prior acts in conflict, and 
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal 
matters.99 The 1909 act created three judicial districts, 
and provided for general elections of the judges.100 In 
1959, the legislature changed the name of the Oklahoma 
Criminal Court of Appeals to the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals.101  
 
2. 1967 Amendment to the 1907 Constitution 
 
There were other changes along the way, but in 
1967, in response to serious criticism and cries for reform, 
Oklahoma adopted a new judicial system.102 According to 
Dean Earl Sneed of the University of Oklahoma Law 
School, the judicial system of Oklahoma by the 1960s 
was, “ancient, creaky, inefficient, outmoded, complex, 
costly, and antiquated.”103 He further stated that the 
system “was not good in 1907, and has grown 
progressively worse in the fifty-eight years since 
statehood[.]”104 While Oklahoma’s appeals courts 
                                               
97 History of the Court, OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS (2014), http://www.okcca.net/History.html. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Earl Sneed, Unfinished Business or All the Way in 
One Play, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 6 (1966) (expounding his 
dissatisfaction with the system of justice in Oklahoma). 
103 Sneed, supra note 102, at 7. 
104 Id. 
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remained largely unchanged since 1907, its lower courts 
were a mess by the 1960s. Dean Sneed provided an 
anecdote that illustrates the frustrating complexity of the 
lower court system. 
 
Fred [a research assistant to Dean Sneed] 
produced seven pages of legal size, single 
spaced material with just the most basic 
facts about our court system. It would have 
been longer, but I told Fred that because of 
the virtual impossibility of the task, he 
should omit any detail about police and 
municipal courts and courts of specialized 
jurisdiction such as the juvenile court in 
Tulsa County, and that he should just 
mention the superior and common pleas 
courts which exist only in a few counties in 
Oklahoma. And of course, since Fred did 
that work in 1954, we have created small 
claims courts, the children's court in 
Oklahoma County, the aforementioned 
special session courts, and city courts. I 
have added three more pages to Fred's 
work.105 
 
At the appellate level, Dean Sneed’s derision of the 
Oklahoma court system focused on judicial appointment 
and selection, judicial salaries, and centralized 
rulemaking power.106 
 One central impetus for the revision of the 
Oklahoma judiciary was the scandal of the 1960s. It came 
to be known that from the 1930s until the 1950s, Justice 
N.S. Corn, along with possibly four other justices, took 
bribes in exchange for dispositions in supreme court 
                                               
105 Id. at 10. 
106 Phillip Simpson, The Modernization and Reform of the 
Oklahoma Judiciary, 3 OKLA. POL. 1, 6 (1994). 
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cases.107 The scandal came to a head in 1956, with a 
$150,000 bribe in the Selected Investment case.108 In July 
of 1964, Justice Corn was sentenced to eighteen months 
in prison.109 Justice Welch was also sentenced to prison, 
and Justice Johnson was impeached.110 In 1966, 
Oklahoma adopted a court on the judiciary.111 
 The battle for reform was hardly over. Once it was 
clear that reform was necessary, Dean Sneed and the 
legislature went to work.112 Dean Sneed would have to go 
to the voters with an initiative petition in order to bypass 
the legislature.113 During this time, anti-reformers were 
ousted in the election of 1966.114 The Sneed plan was 
submitted to the voters, but the legislature had already 
devised its own reform plan.115 The voters rejected 
Sneed’s plan, but reform was ultimately achieved 
through the legislature.116 
 In July 1967, the constitutional provisions that 
repealed and replaced the 1907 Article VII of the 
Oklahoma Constitution were approved.117 “The two most 
significant changes . . .  [to Article VII were the creation 
of] one state trial court of general jurisdiction[,] and . . . 
[the creation of a judicial system] under the supervision 
and control of the [S]upreme Court.”118 The Article 
                                               
107 Id.  
108 Id. See generally Selected Invs. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 
309 P.2d 267 (1957).  
109 Simpson, supra note 106, at 7. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 8. 
112 Id. at 8–9. 
113 Id. at 9. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 9–12. 
116 Id. at 12. 
117 George B. Fraser, Oklahoma’s New Judicial System, 21 
OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1968). 
118 Id. Note that although the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the 
highest court, it still does not maintain jurisdiction in criminal 
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further provides that justices of the supreme court and 
court of criminal appeals shall be nominated by a 
commission and appointed by the governor,119 and that 
other judges are selected through a non-partisan 
election.120 The constitution kept the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
was to have the final say regarding jurisdiction if a 
disagreement between the supreme court and the court 
of criminal appeals arose.121 
 
3. Current Operation 
 
Oklahoma’s judiciary currently includes four 
courts of limited jurisdiction, one trial court of general 
jurisdiction, one civil appeals court, and the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals as courts of last resort.122 
The four courts of limited jurisdiction are 
statutory courts.123 They include the Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Existing Claims, the Court of Tax 
Review, the Municipal Courts not of Record, and the 
Municipal Courts of Record.124 The workers’ 
compensation court and Court of Tax Review are 
appealable directly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The 
Municipal Court not of Record is appealed to the district 
court.125 The Municipal Court of Record is appealable 
                                               
matters. Criminal appeals still only go to the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
119 OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4.  
120 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9. 
121 Id. § 4. Unfortunately, as will be discussed infra, the court 
of criminal appeals does not always follow the jurisdictional 
mandates of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
122 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, Supreme Court Brochure 
(2016), http://www.oscn.net/oscn/schome/fullbrochure.htm.   
123 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.  
124 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, supra note 122. 
125 Id. 
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directly to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.126 
District court decisions can be appealed to both the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, depending on whether the matter is 
civil or criminal.127 
The civil appellate court in Oklahoma operates 
differently than most judicial systems. The constitutional 
amendment of 1967 allowed for the adoption of an 
intermediate appellate court, and the resulting statute 
requires the appeal to go to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, which then may assign appeals to the 
intermediate courts unless otherwise provided by 
statute.128 In other words, all appeals go to the supreme 
court, which then decides which cases it gives to the court 
of civil appeals. All decisions by the court of civil appeals 
are final unless the Oklahoma Supreme Court grants 
certiorari.129 The court of civil appeals currently has four 
divisions, each with three judges. Two divisions are in 
Tulsa County and the other two are in Oklahoma 
County.130 
The courts of last resort in Oklahoma are set up 
differently than they are in Texas because Oklahoma 
places ultimate power to decide jurisdictional conflicts in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.131 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court is composed of nine members coming 
                                               
126 Id. 
127 Id.; see also OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.  
128 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.  
129 Id. The statutes governing the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals can be found in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West 
2017). 
130 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.2 (West 2017). This law 
became effective in 1982. 5 OKLA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRAC. § 
1:26 (2016 ed.). 
131 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Texas courts of last resort are 
coequal, which can result in instances where jurisdiction is 
contested and there is no resolution. See discussion infra Part 
II.A. 
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from nine different districts.132 The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals maintains exclusive jurisdiction in 
criminal appeals,133 and is composed now of five 
members.134  
 
II. Current Issues in Jurisdiction 
 
 Both Texas and Oklahoma suffer from “judicial 
hot potato,” where the courts of last resort either fight 
over jurisdiction to hear a case, or pass a case back and 
forth until the case is either dismissed or forced upon one 
of the courts. This usually results from hard cases that 
have both civil and criminal aspects. Below, I will provide 
examples of different cases that resulted in “judicial hot 
potato” in each of the states’ courts of last resort, and 
compare issues, where relevant, to the federal system. 
 
A. Texas 
 
 This section will explore a few examples that 
demonstrate the issues caused by Texas’s bifurcated 
court structure. These cases involve contempt,135 a civil 
exercise of a stay of execution,136 appeals from property 
forfeiture orders in criminal prosecution,137 and the 
exercise of equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of 
arguably unconstitutional penal laws.138 In the analysis 
section, I will tie together the when and why of these 
jurisdictional tangles. 
                                               
132 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1- 2 (West 2017). 
133 Id. § 40 (West 2017). 
134 Id. (West 2017). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is 
composed of nine members. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.112 
(West 2017). 
135 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
136 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 88 
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
137 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
138 Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
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The primary drawback in a bifurcated court of last 
resort system is determining which courts get which 
cases when there are both civil and criminal aspects. In 
Texas, an illustrative example of this situation occurred 
in In Re Reece.139 In Reece, the Texas Supreme Court 
grappled with the question of whether a litigant can be 
held in contempt for perjury committed during a 
deposition.140 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
refused to grant habeas review because the case that 
gave rise to the contempt order was civil.141 The Texas 
Supreme Court held that it could exercise mandamus 
jurisdiction because the relator did not have an adequate 
remedy by appeal, precisely because there was not a 
criminal appeals court that would hear his habeas 
petition.142 
 The Texas Supreme Court can only exercise 
habeas jurisdiction when “the contemnor’s confinement 
is on account of a violation of an order, judgment, or 
decree previously made in a civil case.”143 The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, maintains 
general habeas jurisdiction.144 The law giving the Texas 
Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction was designed to keep 
civil trials on the civil side of the bifurcated courts.145 
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to 
hear the relator’s habeas petition, and the Texas 
Supreme Court did not have habeas jurisdiction because 
there was not a violation of a specific court order, the 
relator claimed he was without adequate remedy by 
appeal.146 
                                               
139 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
140 Id. at 362. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 369 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(e)). 
144 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5. 
145 See Tex. S.B. 36, 29th Leg., R.S. (1905). 
146 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 369. 
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 The Texas Supreme Court, through statutory 
construction and reliance on prior case law, determined 
that mandamus jurisdiction was broad enough to cover 
instances in which an individual was wrongly held in 
contempt.147 Because the statute in question grants 
broad mandamus jurisdiction, and because there was no 
prohibition on the use of mandamus to free someone from 
confinement, the court reasoned that mandamus 
jurisdiction was permissible.148 Ultimately, because the 
Texas Supreme Court found that the underlying case 
here was civil and there was no habeas jurisdiction, there 
was no adequate remedy by appeal, and thus mandamus 
jurisdiction could be used.149 
 Justice Willett’s dissent is the most informative 
aspect of this case for this Article’s purposes, because he 
outlines many of the flaws in Texas’s bifurcated court 
system.150 Justice Willett noted the court of criminal 
appeals’ “lateral[ed]” to the Texas Supreme Court 
because they mistakenly believed that the supreme court 
had habeas jurisdiction in this case.151 The supreme court 
agreed, 9-0, that there was not habeas jurisdiction.152 The 
                                               
147 Id. at 373–75. 
148 Id; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a). 
149 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 376. 
150 See id. at 378–402 (Willett, J., dissenting). Justice Willett 
begins his jurisdictional diatribe with statements such as, 
“Unfortunately, the juris-imprudent design of the Texas 
judiciary does not make the list. Today's case is a byproduct of 
that recondite web, sparking a game of jurisdictional hot potato 
between us and our constitutional twin, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.” Id. at 378. 
151 Id. at 378 n.1. (“Although this Court does have the authority 
to act in this case pursuant to Article 5, § 5, of the Texas 
Constitution, we decline to do so. Effective 1981, Article 5, § 
3(a) of the Texas Constitution was amended to give the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Justices thereof the authority to issue 
writs of habeas corpus.”) (quoting In re Reece, No. WR–72,199–
02, slip op. at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2009)). 
152 See id. at 378. 
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point Justice Willett made was that even the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort for 
criminal cases, made a mistake navigating the judicial 
labyrinth that Texas created. 
 Justice Willett also pointed out how difficult this 
jurisdictional issue was (and continues to be) for 
litigants. There is a stock letter informing litigants that 
the Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a 
particular area, directing them to re-file in the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals.153 Justice Willett described 
other instances, discussed infra, in which there have 
been jurisdictional quandaries between the two courts of 
last resort.154  
When Justice Willett arrived at the heart of the 
immediate case, he argued that the Texas Supreme Court 
did not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus.155 Both he 
and the majority recognized that the supreme court is 
prohibited by statute from using habeas jurisdiction.156 
Nevertheless, Justice Willett contended that using 
mandamus jurisdiction as a patch to do exactly what 
habeas jurisdiction entails is prohibited by statute.157 
Justice Willett countered the majority’s argument that 
mandamus existed because there was no adequate 
remedy at law by pointing out that there was an adequate 
remedy by appeal through a motion for rehearing in the 
court of criminal appeals.158 Justice Willett then pointed 
out the perils of deciding this case via mandamus 
jurisdiction: If the court granted mandamus here, when 
                                               
153 Id. at 380. 
154 Id. at 384 (including a notable case dealing with anti-
sodomy laws in 1992). 
155 Id. at 391. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (“Where the Legislature has spoken clearly and removed 
the kind of case now before us from our jurisdiction, it is 
disingenuous to circumvent the rule by renaming the 
remedy.”). 
158 Id. at 399. 
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the court of criminal appeals also has habeas jurisdiction, 
litigants will be unsure of the proper court in which to 
file.159 Finally, Justice Willett pointed to the issue of a 
civil court hearing cases in which the appeal arises from 
a criminal penalty.160 The Texas Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the bifurcation issue between civil 
and criminal cases is determined by the nature of the 
court’s punishment.161 Justice Willett concluded his 
dissent with some judicial “shade-throwing,”162 by 
stating, “At the very least (and it grieves me to use these 
six words) Texas should be more like Oklahoma” by 
vesting one court with final determination of 
jurisdictional questions.163 
It is important to note that the distinction 
between civil and criminal contempt in federal court can 
also be a difficult line to draw. My argument throughout 
is that a bifurcated system takes a difficult question and 
                                               
159 Id. (“Similarly, this case leaves open the question of whether 
and when a petitioner may seek review in both courts, and in 
what order. Such confusion could lead to an unnecessarily 
increased docket in either court, or at least wasted resources 
spent shuffling cases between the two systems (or discussing 
whether to do the shuffle in the first place).”). 
160 Id. at 401 (“Further, hearing this case, and perhaps future 
cases like it, may force us to handle appeals from civil cases 
with criminal penalties, and force us at least in part to take on 
quasi-criminal matters.”). 
161 Id. at 371. 
162 See Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Apr. 16, 
2015, 7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/justicewillett/ 
status/588887181554417664 (using “throw shade” colloquially). 
See generally Linette Lopez, This is Where the Expression 
‘Throw Shade’ Comes From, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-the-expression-throw-
shade-comes-from-2015-3 (describing what it means to throw 
shade).  
163 Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 at 402 (describing his desire for a 
court that has clear authority to determine jurisdiction, similar 
to what Oklahoma’s judicial system contains). 
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makes it harder. The decision as to whether an appeal 
from a contempt order is civil or criminal “drives the 
process that is required, including the type of notice, the 
standard of proof, the relevance of the validity of the 
underlying order, and the level of intent.”164 As Judge 
Hartz has noted, the way federal courts determine civil 
and criminal appeals hinges upon “the essential nature 
of the action, not the underlying proceeding it arose from 
. . . .”165 For contempt, this means the distinction is 
whether the judgment is ordered to achieve compliance 
with an order or to punish.166  
Texas’s habeas statute attempts to meet this 
distinction by only granting habeas powers to the Texas 
Supreme Court if the confinement is in violation of a 
court order. An individual was found in contempt of court 
for lying during a deposition, not as a result of a court 
order or decree previously made. It is clear that the 
purpose of the contempt order in this case was to punish. 
The real problem in this case was that the underlying 
civil case resulted in what appears to be a criminal 
contempt judgment. Thus, the purpose was criminal, but 
the underlying proceeding was civil. While the federal 
system may have difficulty distinguishing between 
criminal and civil contempt at times, at least the courts 
and litigants know which judge or court will decide the 
issue. In Texas, the status of the underlying action is 
added to the mix, which means that Judge Hartz’s 
observation will not provide redress to Texas state court 
litigators. One must take into account both the purpose 
of the order and the underlying action. And, the litigator, 
without the supreme court’s creation of the mandamus 
                                               
164 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3950.8 (4th ed. 2016). 
165 In re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 
(4th Cir. 2000)). 
166 See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369–70 
(1966). 
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loophole, would actually be without a court to appeal a 
criminal contempt order arising out of civil trial. 
In Holmes, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
held that they could exercise mandamus jurisdiction to 
prevent an appeals court from exercising civil jurisdiction 
over a stay of execution pending a hearing on clemency.167 
The case concerned inmate Gary Graham, who was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This 
particular case was an attempt by Graham to force the 
Board of Pardon and Paroles to hear Graham’s request 
for clemency through an injunction. The district court 
entered an order to either provide a hearing or enjoin the 
execution until the hearing occurred.168 The Board 
appealed, and the court of appeals entered an injunction 
preventing the execution.169 The relators (the district 
attorney and the Board of Pardons and Pleas) appealed 
up to the court of criminal appeals seeking a writ of 
mandamus.170 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
found that the stay of execution was a criminal law 
matter because capital punishment only arises from 
capital murder convictions.171  
Judge Meyers noted in dissent that the 
controversy surrounding this case arose from the 
bifurcated nature of Texas courts of last resort,172 
identifying the language in the Texas Constitution that 
gave rise to the confusion in this case.173 If “criminal law 
                                               
167 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
168 Id. at 391. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 394. 
172 Id. at 418 (Meyers, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. (“Our Constitution provides that the Supreme Court’s 
‘appellate jurisdiction shall be final and shall extend to all 
cases except in criminal law matters,’” while “[t]his Court, on 
the other hand, has ‘final appellate jurisdiction . . . in all 
criminal cases of whatever grade . . . .’” (quoting TEX. CONST. 
art. V, §§ 3, 5)). 
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matters” and “criminal cases,” as used in the state 
constitution, mean the same thing, then the court of 
criminal appeals would have exclusive jurisdiction.174 
But if they mean something different, then it is possible 
that there is overlapping jurisdiction with civil courts.175 
Judge Meyers suspected that the majority of the court 
refused to allow this case to go through a normal appeal 
process for fear of it being appealed to the Texas Supreme 
Court instead of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
and thus stepped in to prevent that possibility.176 Judge 
Meyers ended his dissent with a scathing statement 
regarding the jurisdictional warfare that he accused the 
majority of waging: 
 
Our entire manner has had the 
appearance of a guerilla raid, when it 
should instead have been a cooperative 
effort to construe fundamental aspects of 
Texas constitutional law. In the process, 
we have violated basic principles of our 
own mandamus jurisprudence, encouraged 
the misuse of habeas corpus, and 
shamelessly interrupted an appellate 
process which was running exactly as 
prescribed by law, and which might very 
well have produced results better than 
expected by the majority had it been 
permitted to proceed to final judgment.177 
 
 Bretz v. State, which involved an individual 
acquitted of receiving and concealing stolen property and 
                                               
174 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 
S.W.2d 389, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Meyers, J., 
dissenting). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 418–19. (stating that Judge Meyers himself is not 
willing to “fight a turf war with other Texas courts”). 
177 Id. at 421. 
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ordered to return the property to the complaining 
witness, provides a much simpler example.178 The 
defendant in the case appealed the order to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals,179 but the court held that it 
did not have jurisdiction.180 Judge Roberts concurred and 
took time to expound the issues presented with 
bifurcated appeals.181 Judge Roberts lamented that even 
though this appeal came from a judgment in a criminal 
trial governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure in 
Texas, the court had to send Bretz “on his way to begin 
yet another search for the proper forum,”182 which, in this 
case, was the Texas Supreme Court. 
 In addition to forfeiture, Judge Roberts brought to 
light a few other instances of the confusion litigants face 
in Texas’s bifurcated court system.183 For example, bond 
forfeiture proceedings are reviewed by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, yet are governed by the rules of civil 
procedure.184 When a defendant seeks a writ of 
mandamus to enforce his right to a speedy trial, the 
defendant must file his petition for the writ in the Texas 
Supreme Court, not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
where presumably the defendant later will be able to 
appeal a conviction and argue that he was denied the 
right to a speedy trial.185 
 The federal courts face similar issues. Bond 
forfeiture proceedings are civil;186 property forfeiture 
                                               
178 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 98 (“Further, I feel that this case presents an excellent 
example of a problem often encountered in this State.”). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 98–99. 
184 Id. 
185 Id.; see also Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1971) 
(judgment set aside on other grounds). 
186 United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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proceedings are criminal.187 But in Texas, the outcomes 
can be absurd. A court that has jurisdiction solely in 
criminal matters must use the rules of civil procedure. 
That scenario cannot exist in a unified system.  
 One high profile case in Texas highlighting the 
problems inherent in a bifurcated court structure came 
in 1994 with a challenge to Texas’s anti-sodomy law.188 In 
State v. Morales, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the 
Texas anti-sodomy law, a criminal statute, could be 
declared unconstitutional by the Texas Supreme Court 
only if it resulted in an irreparable injury to a property 
right.189 The majority held that the court should avoid 
construing rights concerning a penal statute and further 
expressed pragmatic concerns with conflicting opinions 
between the two courts of last resort, noting that the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction in this Texas constitutional challenge.190 
It is not clear why the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
declined to hear this case, although one could postulate 
that because there was no criminal prosecution, the court 
saw no need to take jurisdiction. As a result, the lower 
court’s decision declaring the law unconstitutional was 
reversed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court 
to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.191 Thus, both 
of Texas’s courts of last resort decided that they lacked 
jurisdiction in this case. What is the point of having two 
courts of last resort if neither of them can take a 
particular case?  
Another question arises from the Morales cases: 
How might one case end up in front of both courts of last 
resort? The Attorney General appealed to both courts at 
the same time. The Attorney General was quoted as 
                                               
187 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
188 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
189 Id. at 942. 
190 Id. at 948 n.16. 
191 Id. at 949. 
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saying, “We want to make sure we're not locked out of an 
appeal. It was either file with both or roll the dice.”192 
Even the Attorney General’s office, the law firm of Texas, 
was unsure how to navigate the bifurcated court 
structure. 
 
B. Oklahoma 
 
 Oklahoma’s judiciary, although not loved by all 
members of the Oklahoma bar, seems to enjoy fewer 
jurisdictional quandaries than Texas as a result of the 
1967 large-scale judicial reforms. However, issues still 
remain with Oklahoma’s bifurcated system of courts, 
including the exercise of civil jurisdiction to enjoin an 
execution, juvenile delinquency, and contempt.193 
 The procedural paths of Clayton Lockett and 
Charles Warner’s cases through the Oklahoma judiciary 
form a most tangled web. Warner was convicted at trial 
of first-degree murder and first-degree rape.194 The trial 
court’s conviction was reversed, and the case was 
remanded for a new trial.195 Warner’s second trial also 
resulted in conviction for first-degree murder and first-
degree rape.196 This time, on appeal, Warner’s conviction 
was upheld.197 After losing in the Oklahoma Court of 
                                               
192 In re Coy Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 385 n.68 (Tex. 2011) 
(quoting Janet Elliott, State Appeals Twice in Sodomy Case, 
But Neither High Court May Want ‘Hot Potato’, TEX. 
LAWYER, May 18, 1992, at 1). 
193 See, e.g., Carder v. Court of Crim. App., 595 P.2d 416 (Okla. 
1978) (deciding a jurisdictional issue against the determination 
made by the court of criminal appeals); Ronald N. Ricketts, 
Indirect Contempt in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 213 (1974) 
(discussing the thorny issue of the quasi-criminal nature of 
contempt in a bifurcated appeal system). 
194 See generally Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). 
195 Id. at 575.  
196 Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).  
197 Id. 
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Criminal Appeals, Warner appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which denied certiorari.198 Warner then filed a 
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma.199 The writ was denied, 
and Warner appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where the 
district court’s decision was affirmed.200 Warner then 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the writ of 
certiorari once again was denied.201 
Clayton Derrell Lockett was charged with 
conspiracy, first-degree burglary, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, first-degree 
rape, kidnapping, robbery by force and fear, and first-
degree murder.202 Lockett was convicted on all nine 
counts and sentenced to death.203 The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court below.204 
Lockett then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where 
the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.205 Lockett 
then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, where the 
writ was denied and judgment was entered against 
Lockett.206 Lockett appealed to the Tenth Circuit where 
the judgment was affirmed.207 Certiorari was denied by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.208 
 Lockett and Warner then joined as plaintiffs and 
filed a petition for declaratory relief and requested an 
injunction against the Oklahoma Department of 
                                               
198 Warner v. Oklahoma, 550 U.S. 942 (2007). 
199 Warner v. Workman, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Okla. 
2011). 
200 Warner v. Trammell, 520 Fed. Appx. 675 (10th Cir. 2013). 
201 Warner v. Trammell, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014). 
202 Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 421 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 431. 
205 Lockett v. Oklahoma, 538 U.S. 982 (2003). 
206 Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 WL 10843368 
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011). 
207 Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013). 
208 Lockett v. Trammel, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014). 
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Corrections on a challenge to the constitutionality of an 
Oklahoma statute209 that concealed the identity of the 
drugs to be used in their executions.210 The Oklahoma 
Attorney General’s Office removed the case to the United 
States District Court, due to Lockett and Warner’s 
invocation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.211 Lockett and Warner then amended their 
complaint to remove federal issues, and the case was 
remanded back to the Oklahoma district court.212 The 
Oklahoma district court then found that jurisdiction for 
issuing a temporary injunction lays solely in the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.213 Plaintiffs 
appealed the trial court’s order finding jurisdiction lays 
solely in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court.214 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court remanded the declaratory judgment matter to the 
trial court for resolution of civil matters, and transferred 
the emergency stay of execution motion to the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals.215 During this time, however, 
the state of Oklahoma was unable to procure execution 
drugs, and thus a thirty-day stay was entered and the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the 
emergency stay motion as moot.216 
 The district court then ruled on the declaratory 
judgment and found the confidentiality law 
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution as a 
                                               
209 See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1015(B) (2011) (“The 
identity of all persons who participate in or administer the 
execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical 
supplies or medical equipment for the execution shall be 
confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any civil or 
criminal proceedings.”). 
210 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 58 (Okla. 2014). 
211 Id. at 59. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 60. 
34
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/3
JUDICIAL HOT POTATO 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2018) 
 
 
[195] 
denial of the plaintiffs’ right to access the courts.217 The 
plaintiffs then sought a stay of execution pending the 
appeal of the district court’s declaratory judgment.218 The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, denied 
the stay of execution, holding that it may only issue a stay 
of execution pending a challenge to conviction or sentence 
of death.219 The plaintiffs again appealed to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which exercised jurisdiction 
in deciding the constitutional question220 but ruled that 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals maintained 
jurisdiction to issue a stay of execution.221 Thus, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court—per its constitutional 
authority—instructed the court of criminal appeals to 
take jurisdiction.222 Unfortunately, this was not the end 
of the judicial hot potato. 
 Upon receiving the case from the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court for a second time, and after a clear 
pronouncement of jurisdiction from that court, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction and held: 
 
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
authority to deem an issue civil and so 
                                               
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Lockett v. State, 329 P.3d 755, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014). 
Note the similarity to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal’s 
denial of review in Reece. Because the appeal arose out of a civil 
matter, the Reece court denied relief. 
220 Lockett v. Evans, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Okla. 2014). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 1254–55 (“In exercising our constitutional power to 
determine jurisdiction, we transfer ‘only’ the Application for 
Emergency Stay to the Court of Criminal Appeals. In so doing, 
we urge the appellate criminal court to be cognizant of the time 
restraints associated with the submission of the appeal(s) to 
this Court along with the gravity of the first impression 
constitutional issues this Court will be charged with in 
addressing the civil appeal, or appeals.”). 
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within its jurisdiction, it does not have the 
power to supersede a statute and 
manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for 
Appellants’ stay request by merely 
transferring it here. Therefore, Appellants’ 
application for stays of execution is 
DENIED.223 
 
In response to the court of criminal appeals’ refusal to 
exercise its jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
wrote: 
 
On April, 17, 2014, Thursday 
last, we exercised our constitutional 
authority to determine the appropriate 
tribunal for resolution of the stay issue 
under the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 
7, section 4, vesting this Court with the 
sole power to determine whether the 
jurisdiction of the stay issue was within 
this Court or the Court of Criminal 
Appeals. In so doing, we transferred the 
request for stay “alone” to the Court of 
Criminal Appeals. 
The majority of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals refused to exercise this 
Court's order and to address the merits of 
the stay. That order, which we consider to 
be invalid as not having followed the 
constitutional directive of this Court, have 
[sic] now resulted in a situation never 
contemplated by the drafters of 
Oklahoma's ultimate rule of law—that this 
tribunal be inserted into death penalty 
                                               
223 Lockett, 329 P.3d at 758. 
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cases. A position generally reserved for the 
Court of Criminal Appeals.224 
 
As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined 
that the rule of necessity required them to take 
jurisdiction in this case to issue a stay of execution 
pending the outcome of the civil challenge to the 
confidentiality statute.225 For the first time in the state’s 
history, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took jurisdiction 
in a death penalty appeal.226 Unfortunately, the stay of 
execution was not the end of the matter. 
 In the final opinion issued before the executions of 
Lockett and Warner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
appeared to backpedal. The supreme court reversed the 
trial court’s decision, which held section 22.1015(B) 
unconstitutional.227 The supreme court also dissolved its 
stay of execution.228 The concurrence rings of “I told you 
so,” when Justice Taylor writes: 
 
I warned this Court in my previous 
dissents against crossing the Rubicon and 
now that crossing has caused a quagmire. 
Had this Court transferred all issues in 
this appeal to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals as I previously advocated, the 
matter would have been resolved without 
this Court ignoring precedent and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals’ role in our 
judicial system.229 
 
                                               
224 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (Okla. 2014) (emphasis in 
original). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 62 (Taylor, J., dissenting). 
227 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014). 
228 Id. at 492. 
229 Id. at 493 (Taylor, J., concurring). 
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 Why did the court experience such a rapid about-
face regarding these jurisdictional issues? Between the 
opinion issuing a stay of execution on April 21, 2014, and 
the opinion dissolving the stay of execution on April 23, 
2014, some unusual events transpired in the governance 
of Oklahoma. First, Governor Mary Fallin proclaimed 
that she would not comply with the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s stay of execution, stating, “I cannot give effect to 
the order by that honorable court.”230 Let that sink in: 
The executive branch of Oklahoma refused to comply 
with the stay of execution issued by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, and would execute the inmates 
regardless, by reasoning that the supreme court’s 
“attempted stay of execution is outside the constitutional 
authority of that body” and that only an order by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would be binding 
in this case.231 The next day Representative Mike 
Christian of the Oklahoma legislature began 
impeachment proceedings against the justices in the 
majority opinion issuing the stay of execution.232 As a 
result, the supreme court reversed its position and 
allowed the executions to proceed, despite the secrecy of 
the drugs—the very same drugs that caused Warner’s 
last word to be, “My body is on fire.”233 
 What ultimately caused this jurisdictional hot 
potato was the insertion of a civil suit into a death row 
case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court felt compelled by 
necessity to enter the “quagmire” of a suit requesting a 
stay of execution in order to decide the constitutional 
implications of the government’s policy forbidding 
disclosure of the lethal injection drugs. Events like this 
could not occur in the federal system. Every Article III 
                                               
230 Andrew Cohen, Oklahoma Just Neutered its State Supreme 
Court, THE WEEK, (Apr. 29, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/ 
447457/oklahoma-just-neutered-state-supreme-court. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Murphy, supra note 15. 
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court has the authority to decide the entire controversy 
(subject to subject matter jurisdiction) regardless of the 
civil or criminal aspects. A federal court may struggle to 
determine which rules of procedure may apply, but there 
is no question as to which court has the ability to hear a 
case. While the story of Charles Warner and Clayton 
Lockett is certainly a dramatic example of the pitfalls of 
bifurcated courts of last resort, there are others that 
generate less controversy. 
 In Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the court of criminal 
appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition, 
a demand for a change of custody hearing for a juvenile 
who had been adjudicated delinquent and a ward of the 
state.234 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals does not have 
general supervisory jurisdiction of lower courts, and 
cannot hear cases that do not arise out of criminal 
matters.235 It is important to note that had this appeal 
originated from an adjudication of delinquency or 
certification to stand trial as an adult, the result would 
have been different. But because the matter was instead 
a subsequent court action where the father sought to 
return his son to his custody, there was no longer court of 
criminal appeals jurisdiction.  
A jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals that remains unresolved is that of contempt, 
which, as already noted, has aspects of both criminal and 
civil jurisdiction. Contempt, according to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, is sui generis and not criminal. In the 
federal system, contempt can be either criminal or civil. 
The distinction lies in whether the purpose is to punish 
or to induce compliance. 
In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Owens, the 
dispute arose out of the contempt conviction of a certain 
                                               
234 595 P.2d 416, 418 (Okla. 1978). 
235 Id. at 419. 
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Mr. O. O. Owens, who published defamatory statements 
about some of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
members.236 From a federal perspective, the purpose was 
to punish Mr. Owens for his statements. Owens filed a 
habeas petition with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals after being found in contempt by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court.237 The supreme court directed a writ of 
prohibition to the court of criminal appeals regarding the 
habeas petition, but the court of criminal appeals 
proceeded anyway and ordered Owens’s release.238 Once 
again, here is an instance in which the constitutionally-
superior Oklahoma Supreme Court is defied by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. One can hardly 
blame the court of criminal appeals, however, because 
the punishment of Mr. Owens for his defamatory 
statements appears to be criminal through any lens. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently 
quashed the order of release in Dancy v. Owens.239 
Fortunately, in this case—juxtaposed with the Lockett v. 
Evans saga—the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
did not act in further contravention of the holding of the 
supreme court.240 Less fortunate is the fact that there 
still remains jurisdictional confusion with regard to 
contempt because the court of criminal appeals held that 
contempt is a misdemeanor in Roselle v. State241 and the 
supreme court still maintained that contempt is sui 
generis in Young v. Woodson.242 As noted above in my 
                                               
236 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 256 P. 704, 705 (Okla. 
1927). 
237 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 216. 
238 See generally Ex parte Owens, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1927). 
239 258 P. 879 (1927). 
240 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 217 (noting that it was not 
until forty years after Dancy that the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court once again addressed contempt). 
241 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). 
242 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974). 
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discussion of contempt in Texas, it is often difficult to 
determine whether contempt is civil or criminal. But once 
again, the difficulty is exacerbated when two courts of 
last resort have to decide the question. 
 
III. Attempts to Eliminate Bifurcated Courts 
A. Texas 
 
 Texas has not been silent in its desire to eliminate 
the bifurcated court system. There have been four 
distinct proposals in the past twenty years to eliminate 
the bifurcated court system, some introduced more than 
once.243 The 1993 effort proposed to eliminate the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer all criminal cases 
to the Texas Supreme Court. A 1999 proposal would have 
merged the two courts into one high court composed of 
fifteen justices: seven would be appointed by the 
governor, seven would be elected, and the chief justice 
would be appointed and had to be from a different district 
than the previous appointment.244 In 2003, the proposal 
was substantially the same as 1993—eliminate the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer jurisdiction to 
the Texas Supreme Court.245 In 2011 and 2013, the same 
bill to eliminate the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was 
introduced.246 Unfortunately, none of the bills presented 
received any real consideration.247 
 
 
 
                                               
243 Bill Raftery, Trying to Eliminate the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals: Will Fourth Attempt in 20 years Succeed?, 
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec. 6, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/ 
2012/12/06/trying-to-eliminate-the-texas-court-of-criminal-
appeals-will-fourth-attempt-in-20-years-succeed/. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See id. (noting that only a few bills even received a hearing). 
41
et al.: Judicial Hot Potato
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[202] 
B. Oklahoma 
 
 Oklahoma, despite the controversies it has 
endured, has had far less legislative attempts to 
eliminate its bifurcated court structure. Although it has 
been criticized on record as early as 1919 at a meeting of 
the Oklahoma State Bar Association,248 there have only 
been two instances of proposed reforms since the Sneed 
plan in 1967.249 One was an attempt to create a third 
court of last resort specifically for capital cases.250 
Oklahoma’s other attempt to modify its court structure 
occurred in 2012; the proposal called for the elimination 
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as well as the 
transfer of the power of constitutional review by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court to an ad hoc court of 
constitutional review created by the legislature.251 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
 A bifurcated court system causes unique 
jurisdictional “quagmires.” Bifurcating criminal and civil 
jurisdiction is usually intuitive and simple in the vast 
majority of cases, but there are enough significant issues 
                                               
248 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
OKLAHOMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 126 (Walter Lybrand, 
ed.1919) (discussing a wholescale replacement of the 
Oklahoma judiciary, including a single supreme court). 
249 See Simpson, supra note 106 (noting that the Sneed plan 
was defeated).  
250 H.R.J. Res. 1022, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) 
(introduced by the same individual who introduced articles of 
impeachment against the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 
response to the Lockett debacle). 
251 See S.J. Res. 83, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); Bill Raftery, 
Recent Legislative Efforts to Eliminate, or Create, Bifurcated 
Criminal and Civil Appellate Courts, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/04/30/recent-legislative-efforts-
to-eliminate-or-create-bifurcated-criminal-and-civil-appellate-
courts/. 
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to justify greater scrutiny of the system. Oklahoma and 
Texas are the only two states in the union that maintain 
this judicial system. No other state (including those with 
large populations such as California, New York, and 
Florida) maintains a bifurcated system of courts of last 
resort. If the overwhelming majority of states and the 
federal system maintain a single court of last resort, 
there might be good reason for Oklahoma and Texas to 
consider following the crowd.  
Texas and Oklahoma suffer from failures to 
distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
cases that maintain aspects of both. These cases create 
confusion for litigants as well as inter-judicial warring. 
Texas and Oklahoma do not have a compelling 
justification for maintaining bifurcated courts and should 
either combine the two courts into one, or develop a 
bifurcated system of intermediate appellate courts, with 
one court of last resort that has full appellate jurisdiction 
for all matters. 
  When one looks at the cases listed in Part II, one 
can find a unifying theme in the jurisdictional 
quandaries in which these courts have found themselves. 
In every single case outlined above, there have been 
aspects of both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In re Reece 
involved contempt in the context of a civil deposition.252 
This case arose out of a civil case, but was essentially a 
habeas petition, which the Texas Supreme Court 
generally cannot hear.253 However, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals refused to hear the habeas petition 
because it determined the case was civil in nature, 
arising from a civil case.254 In Oklahoma, contempt 
jurisdiction is still unresolved. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court determined that contempt is sui generis,255 but the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that 
                                               
252 In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 362. 
255 Young v. Woodson, 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974). 
43
et al.: Judicial Hot Potato
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[204] 
contempt is a misdemeanor and thus under its sole 
jurisdiction.256 
 One might point to the federal system and suggest 
that contempt is a difficult distinction even for a unified 
court system.257 This underscores my point. If it is 
difficult for a single court, it is even more complicated for 
a bifurcated system. At the end of the process, at least 
the litigant has the promise of finality in a unified 
system. The U.S. Supreme Court can make a 
determination and it will be the end of the matter. In 
Oklahoma and Texas, the litigant still does not know! If 
past performance is evidence of future conduct, Texas’s 
and Oklahoma’s high courts will play judicial hot potato 
again. 
 Other examples where the federal courts have 
struggled to determine the difference between civil and 
criminal jurisdiction include: appeals from criminal 
forfeiture,258 appeals from firearms prohibitions imposed 
on felons,259 and appeals from denials of requests to 
release grand jury transcripts for use in a habeas 
proceeding.260 In each of these cases there are aspects of 
both civil and criminal jurisdiction, yet the firearms 
appeals and the jury transcript requests were both held 
to be civil and the forfeiture of assets appeal was held to 
be criminal. In Texas and Oklahoma, the supreme court 
must think about how the court of criminal appeals would 
rule, and vice versa, in order to prevent jurisdictional 
holes or gaps from propagating. Reece is a perfect 
example. The Texas Supreme Court had to contort its 
                                               
256 Rosell v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). 
257 See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994). 
258 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
259 Palma v. U.S., Dept. of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 228 
F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2000). 
260 United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
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jurisdiction to meet a gap in habeas jurisdiction.261 At 
least unified systems will generate an answer that will 
effectively guide litigants, and keep them from having to 
“roll the dice.”262 
 Litigants themselves struggle to navigate the 
system. In State v. Morales,263 the Attorney General of 
Texas appealed to both the Texas Supreme Court and the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not knowing which 
court had jurisdiction. In Bretz v. State, a litigant 
appealed an order to return property that he was 
acquitted of stealing.264 One could reasonably assume 
that because the order came from a criminal trial, the 
appeal would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Unfortunately, Texas maintains that this appeal belongs 
in a civil appeals court, not criminal. Texas does follow 
the federal rule,265 but in Texas, one has to file an entirely 
new motion and appeal to an entirely different court if 
the original appeal was brought in the wrong court. In 
federal court, a litigant could simply amend her motion 
and remain in front of the same court. 
 Because it is difficult to determine which court of 
last resort has jurisdiction, litigants have to expend more 
resources identifying the appropriate appellate forum, 
and judicial resources are wasted determining which 
court has jurisdiction. The Lockett/Warner debacle is a 
perfect example: A case was bounced around for years 
with the courts fighting over who did or did not have 
jurisdiction. 
Texas and Oklahoma have experienced inter-
judicial warring because of their bifurcated court 
structures. In re Reece is an example where the Texas 
Supreme Court essentially had to step in and take 
                                               
261 In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
262 See supra note 192. 
263 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
264 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
265 See, e.g., United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
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jurisdiction because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
refused.266 In Oklahoma, Lockett v. Evans passed in front 
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court six times after being 
sent to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on 
multiple occasions.267 In Texas, it is understandable that 
the courts of last resort must tread lightly in deferring to 
the other court. The two courts are coequal, both provided 
for in the constitution and both with final appellate 
jurisdiction in their respective spheres.268 In Texas there 
is no ultimate authority to decide jurisdictional mistakes. 
If both courts deny jurisdiction, there is no court to hear 
the case. This is a serious problem that could only be 
resolved through a constitutional amendment, because 
interpretation of jurisdiction is a constitutional matter. 
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the 
constitutional power to decide final jurisdictional issues, 
it appears to be illusory. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
made a final adjudication in Lockett v. Evans, holding 
that the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction, yet 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to 
exercise its jurisdiction in that case.269 
 Thus, we find that the expense and headache 
created by the bifurcated system is not worth the candle. 
The system is inefficient, confusing, and contentious. The 
arguments in favor of the system are dispelled below.  
 The argument that Texas and Oklahoma require 
bifurcated courts to handle a more significant caseload is 
not a compelling one. For instance, the California 
Supreme Court received 9,739 matters in 2013.270 By 
comparison, the Texas Supreme Court received only 778 
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals received 5,875, 
                                               
266 See supra Part II.A. 
267 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 493 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J., 
concurring). 
268 See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–3, 5. 
269 Lockett, 330 P.3d 488. 
270 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2013 CALIFORNIA COURT 
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS xvi (2013). 
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for a total court of last resort case disposition of 6,653 
matters.271 This shows that California, with one court, 
was able to complete 3,086 more matters than Texas with 
two courts. Oklahoma, being a far less populous state, 
also cannot justify its bifurcated system based on the 
number of matters disposed. 
 The argument that a bifurcated court of last resort 
system increases the expertise of the judiciary does not 
outweigh the problems such a system creates. There is 
little evidence to suggest that federal courts suffer from 
a lack of expertise in disposing of criminal or civil 
matters, except for the occasional issue such as ERISA or 
patent litigation.272 Even if Oklahoma and Texas want to 
keep their expert judges in criminal and civil matters, 
they could do so through specialized mid-level appeals 
courts, which I will outline infra. 
 In light of these jurisdictional issues and the 
examples from the vast majority of other states, my 
recommendation is that both Texas and Oklahoma 
should abolish their bifurcated court system. There 
should be three constitutional courts including a trial 
court of general jurisdiction, an appeals court with 
general appellate jurisdiction, and one supreme court 
with general appellate jurisdiction. This would require 
the elimination of the current system in Oklahoma where 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court handles all appeals and 
has discretion in passing appeals down to the Oklahoma 
Court of Appeals. 
                                               
271 OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013 24, 30 
(2013). 
272 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights Into 
Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 LAB. & 
EMP. L. F. 2 (2013) (arguing for specialized judges to handle 
ERISA litigation); William Watkins, We Need a Specialized 
Patent Trial Court, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/583409/we-need-a-
specialized-patent-trial-court. 
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 Texas would eliminate a significant number of its 
own courts, including county courts and justice of the 
peace courts. I also recommend that Texas reduce the 
total number of courts of appeal from the current 
fourteen to a more manageable six or seven. Texas should 
increase the number of judges on the courts of appeal, 
and limit the districts to readily discernable geographic 
and demographic areas. This will decrease the role of the 
Texas Supreme Court as an arbiter of district splits and 
allow it to grant certiorari on appeals that present novel 
and important issues. 
 If, on the other hand, Texas and Oklahoma would 
like to maintain the specialization in having a bifurcated 
appeals system, there is still room to clean up the 
jurisdictional conflicts. In the late 1960s, Tennessee and 
Alabama both instituted bifurcated mid-level appellate 
courts.273 Neither state has attempted to amend or 
eliminate its system in the past twenty years.274 
 There are numerous benefits of a bifurcated mid-
level appeals court with a single court of last resort. The 
mid-level appeals courts would develop significant 
specialties in their respective jurisdiction, thus 
maintaining one of the principal arguments in favor of 
the bifurcated courts of last resort while decreasing 
jurisdictional headaches. The courts would have less 
work, and thus could reach a disposition more quickly.275 
Additionally, the supreme court may come to be viewed 
as playing more of an administrative role, with the mid-
level courts acting similar to a court of last resort. I 
                                               
273 See Raftery, supra note 243 (listing both Alabama and 
Tennessee as states that have bifurcated mid-level appellate 
courts). 
274 Id. 
275 For example, Tennessee’s mid-level courts of appeal 
maintained near or above a 100% clearance rate. See 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013‐2014 11, 13 
(2014). 
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would, however, allow mandatory supreme court 
jurisdiction for death penalty cases due to the incredibly 
sensitive nature of those cases. 
 The mid-level court would in most instances be 
the last court that litigants see. Without a right of appeal 
to the supreme court (except in capital cases), the mid-
level appeals courts would have final authority on nearly 
all decisions. Only in cases where the supreme court 
either finds serious errors in reasoning, circuit splits, or 
jurisdictional mistakes would it review a case. Thus, 
these specialized courts would for most purposes remain 
the last court to which litigants argue. 
If there are questions regarding jurisdictional 
issues between the mid-level courts (which, as we have 
seen from bifurcated courts of last resort, is inevitable) 
the supreme court could easily dispose of the 
jurisdictional issue and the lower courts would be bound. 
There would be no debacles like Reece or Lockett because 
the supreme court would have ultimate authority on all 
issues of state law. 
For example, if we apply the novel mid-level 
bifurcated structure to the facts of Reece, where the Texas 
Supreme Court used a tenuous interpretation of its 
mandamus power to prevent a significant gap in 
appellate review, there would have been a different 
outcome.276 If the mid-level court of criminal appeals 
denied jurisdiction, the civil appeals court would likely 
have never entered the picture. The appeal of the denial 
of habeas would go up to the unified supreme court of last 
resort, where that court presumably would have 
determined that the court of criminal appeals did have 
jurisdiction in this case. Because the unified supreme 
court is a higher court and sets binding precedent for the 
court of criminal appeals, that court would have heard 
the case and disposed of the issue. 
Cases like Bretz v. State would also be avoided. 
Litigants would have the knowledge that if a mistake 
                                               
276 See supra Part II.A. 
49
et al.: Judicial Hot Potato
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[210] 
concerning jurisdiction was made on their part, the 
supreme court could remand to the proper court. 
Additionally, when the mistaken jurisdiction of the 
litigant is clear to the mid-level court reviewing the case, 
Texas and Oklahoma could institute a process similar to 
the process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1631.277 This would 
allow a civil court to transfer a case to a criminal court 
and vice versa.278 The result would be preservation of the 
case to avoid timing issues in appeals. Further, if there 
were a mistake on the part of the transferring court, the 
supreme court would have the authority to make a final 
determination and remand for adjudication. There would 
still remain extra expense in litigation, but there also 
would be the added benefit of judicial expertise in 
specialized courts. 
One might question whether the outcome of 
Lockett would have been any different in a system of 
bifurcated intermediate courts. I argue that it would. On 
the first appeal, Lockett would appeal to either the 
criminal or civil court of appeals. If he appealed to the 
wrong court, or the court incorrectly determined that it 
did not have jurisdiction, the case would be appealed up 
to the unified supreme court. This court would be able to 
make a single determination regarding which court had 
jurisdiction, and its decree would be binding law on all 
parties. There would not be the denial of the order by the 
court of criminal appeals because the unified supreme 
court is objectively higher. Even if the mid-level court of 
criminal appeals defied the order of the unified supreme 
court (which is highly unlikely), the supreme court would 
have jurisdiction to decide the case itself, thus 
eliminating the tenuous judicial acrobatics necessary to 
shoehorn civil into criminal, or vice versa. As Justice 
Jackson famously wrote, “We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
                                               
277 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982). 
278 Id. 
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final.”279 One court of last resort eliminates a contest of 
equals jockeying for position and creates finality binding 
on all. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 “Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice 
is as old as law. Not to go outside our own legal system, 
discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree.”280 The 
Texas and Oklahoma judiciary systems are problematic. 
In Oklahoma, the result of a judicial hot potato led to the 
botched execution of a convicted murderer using 
experimental drugs.281 In Texas, the Texas Supreme 
Court used mandamus jurisdiction for what was 
essentially a habeas petition, because the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear a writ of habeas corpus arising from an individual 
being held in contempt in an underlying civil trial, 
despite the fact that the purpose of the contempt order 
was criminal punishment.282 These jurisdictional issues 
affect real human beings and deserve the attention of 
legislators and reformers. Texas and Oklahoma should 
seriously consider amending their constitutions to 
reconstruct their judicial systems to contain only one 
court of last resort with general appellate jurisdiction in 
order to ensure there will always be a court to hear a case. 
  
                                               
279 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. 
concurring). 
280 Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Some Thoughts for Judicial Reform in 
Oklahoma, 10 TULSA L. J. 91, 91 (1974) (quoting Roscoe Pound, 
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice (1906)). 
281 See Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014). 
282 See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
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